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THE IMPACT OF THE NEW NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY ON PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING:
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
Arvid Anderson*
INTRODUCTION

This Conference poses the rhetorical question: A New National
Labor Policy? Yes, there is a new national labor policy. This paper will
chart both the shape of this new policy and its impact on public sector
bargaining. Further, it will analyze some of the problems emanating
from this trend and make a number of recommendations for a
different national labor policy.
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND PATCO

Our analysis of the new national labor policy in the public sector
must begin with an examination of the Reagan Administration's
handling of the PATCO strike. 1 At an early stage in the Reagan
Administration, organized labor, through Tom Donahue, SecretaryTreasurer of the AFL-CIO, had voiced the hope that, at best, labor
would be benignly neglected. One year later, Donahue charged that
the Administration's policy towards public employees was
exemplified by "its intemperate and vindictive response" to the
PATCO strike which has "established a climate of fear and resentment
2
that puts unreasonable strains on public employees at every level."
* Mr.Anderson received his J.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1948 and is presently
Chairman of the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining.
1. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization had been the recognized
exclusive bargaining representative for Federal Aviation Administration controllers since the
early 1970's. Faced with the expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement, PATCO
and the FAA began negotiations for a new contract in early 1981. A tentative agreement was
reached in June but was overwhelmingly rejected by PATCO's rank and file. Negotiations began
anew in late July with PATCO announcing a strike deadline of Monday, August 3, 1981.
After failing to reach an agreement, PATCO struck the FAA on the morning of August 3
with more than 70% of the federally employed controllers walking off the job. The
Administration, in response, obtained restraining orders against the strike. Civil and criminal
contempt citations followed as the strike continued.
On the morning of the first day of the strike, President Reagan gave the striking controllers
48 hours to return to work or face dismissal. Some 11,000 controllers who did not return to work
on their first scheduled shift were terminated on August 5, 1981.
For a full discussion see, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 685 F.2d. 547 (1982).
2. 13 LABOR-MANAGEMENT REL. SERV. NEWSLETrER 2 (Feb. 1982) at 4.
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Certainly, the most dramatic illustration of the Reagan
Administration's hard line policy toward organized labor was its
handling of the PATCO strike.3 The decision of the Administration to
fire all of the striking air traffic controllers and its refusal to consider
their reemployment has few, if any, parallels in labor history. On the
contrary, history demonstrates that, in both the public and private
sectors, employers who have successfully endured or beaten a strike,
even an illegal strike, are usually more than willing to rehire most of
their striking employees. The employers conclude that the dispute
was with the union, not with their employees and thus, for economic
if not for compassionate reasons, employers want to reemploy their
trained and experienced employees, except, of course, in those
instances where strikers may have committed acts of violence or
engaged in other egregious conduct.
The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, has not been
willing to reemploy the striking controllers. The Administration has
demonstrated its ability to maintain air travel, despite the strike,
through the assistance of military and supervisory personnel; but, it is
quite another matter for state and local governments to replace a large
number of striking police officers, firefighters, transit employees,
prison guards, or highly trained hospital workers on a permanent
basis. New York State, for example, attempted a similar approach
toward striking civil servants in the mid-1960's with the passage of the
Condon-Wadlin Act. 4 That statute was essentially a public employee
anti-strike law providing for heavy penalties, including loss of
employment and frozen wages for three years, for employees who
engaged in a strike. After enacting Condon-Wadlin, however, the
New York State Legislature was forced, on five separate occasions, to
pass amnesty bills permitting the reemployment of strikers because
they were needed to get the subways running, to man the ferry boats,
and to issue welfare checks. 5
While the Administration has shown no willingness to grant
amnesty to the air controllers, it declined to confront its postal
employees in a similar manner and agreed to a stipulation of
settlement which allowed former striking postal employees
conditionally to apply for reemployment with the postal service.
These striking employees were given the opportunity to re-enter
government service at locations other than those at which they struck
3. 948 G.E.R.R. 16 (Feb. 1, 1982).
4. 1958 N.Y. Laws Ch. 790, § 108 (Condon-Wadlin Act) (repealed 1967).
5. 1966 N.Y. Laws Ch. 6, § 2 (transit workers); 1966 N.Y. Laws Ch. 807, § 1 (ferry boat
officers); 1966 N.Y. Laws Ch. 808, § 1 (welfare workers); 1967 N.Y. Laws Ch. 394, § 1 (welfare
workers).
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or in other units of the federal government. This is not to endorse in
any way PATCO's conduct or its objectives in an illegal strike.
Whatever it was possible for a labor organization to do wrong in the
conduct of negotiations and an illegal strike, PATCO did. Still, the
Administration's hard line concerning reemployment is a particularly
harsh and vindictive policy when contrasted with the treatment
afforded other federal employees who have violated anti-strike
statutes. While it must be conceded that a penalty should be imposed
for the violation of an anti-strike statute, it is axiomatic that the
penalty should fit the offense. It seems fair to assume that one of the
intended effects of the Administration's PATCO policy was to chill
public employee union militancy and to instill fear in the minds of
union members as to the consequences of an illegal strike. Enforcing
reasonable penalties for illegal strikes is a necessary policy. On the
other hand, the availability of an equitable means of impasse
resolution is all the more necessary where the right to strike is
denied.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL POLICIES: THE NEW FEDERALISM
AND ITS IMPACT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

The Administration's attitude toward public sector labor also is
evidenced by the reductions in force which have resulted from federal
budget cuts and by the related policies of reducing the work week and
earnings of federal employees. Although the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management has described reductions in force (RIFs) as a
non-problem, RIFs have induced considerable bargaining with the
6
federal unions as to the impact of such decisions on the employees.
Furthermore, the fiscal policies of the federal government,
specifically the reductions in federal spending already effectuated and
those proposed, including the elimination of the CETA programs; the
reduction in aid for mass transit, education, law enforcement and
health care, and revenue sharing, 7 have impacted severely on the
budgets of state and local governments. A recent survey by the
Bureau of National Affairs reports that layoffs of state workers
occurred in 43 of the 50 states in fiscal year 1981, and in 44 states in
fiscal year 1982.8 In the two-year period, 46 states attributed layoffs,
in part, to the reduced federal funding of various programs. The BNA
study also indicated that a higher percentage of women and minorities
6. 965 G.E.R.R. 7 (May 31, 1982).
7. Pear, Social Programs Facing Substantial Reductions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1982, at
A21, col. 1.
8. Layoffs, RIFS, and EEO in the PublicSector, A BNA SpecialReport, 949 G.E.R.R. 13
(Feb. 8, 1982).
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have been laid off as a result of federal cutbacks. The Public
Employment Department of the AFL-CIO estimated that some
700,000 public sector workers will be laid off as a result of the federal
government budget cuts in fiscal years 1982 and 1983.9
A less dramatic, but no less significant, example of the new
national labor policy can be found in the sharp budgetary cutbacks of
the federal regulatory agencies which are responsible for carrying out
the Administration's labor policies. The Labor Department, the
Federal Services Impasse Panel, the Merit Systems Protection
Board, the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Labor
Relations Authority all have had their budgets reduced so sharply that
serious questions are raised as to their ability to assist in resolving
employee grievances and contract disputes. 10
The hoped for expansion of the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
data-gathering capabilities in the public sector is another casualty of
the budget cuts. The Bureau has even announced that it will be
discontinuing its important Municipal Wage Survey of major cities.
These curtailments have raised doubts as to the Bureau's ability to
carry out its current responsibilities in a timely and effective
11
manner.
Other examples of the new federal labor policy include the
abandonment of wage guidelines, the abolishment of the Council on
Wage and Price Stability, and the abandonment of the National
Accord, the broad charter adopted by the Carter Administration
providing for consultation with organized labor on economic policy. It
is now likely that the Administration will again recommend a wage
scale for federal employees which will be far below the figure called
2
for by the statutory comparability guidelines. 1
On a more positive note, the Administration should be credited
with having resolved the major postal contracts in a manner
satisfactory to all parties, including cooperating in the submission to
interest arbitration of impasses for some of the smaller postal
contracts. 1 3 Also, despite endorsing the "new federalism," which
means less federal involvement in state problems, the Administration
appeared on the side of federal preemption as amicus curiae on behalf
9. Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO, News Release (May 18, 1982).
10. 965 G.E.R.R. 7 (May 31, 1982); 945 G.E.R.R. 16, 17 (Jan. 11, 1982).
11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, REGIONAL REPORT No. 7,
WAGES AND BENEFITS OF NEW YORK CITY'S MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT WORKERS MAY 1980

at iii (June 1981).
12. 901 G.E.R.R. 5 (Feb. 23, 1981).
13. Mail Handlers Divison of Laborers International Union and United States Postal
Service (Arbitrators: Donald P. Goodman, Stephen E. Tallent, and Denis F. Gordon, Jan. 18,
1982) 947 G.E.R.R. 8 (Jan. 25, 1982).
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of the railroad unions in a case decided by the United States Supreme
Court this year. 14
AN ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY

Having described the Administration's labor policy and its
impact on public employees, I would like to propose an alternative,
new national labor policy. This model would better serve the public
interest by encouraging, supporting, and protecting collective
bargaining rights for all public employees. During the 1960's and
1970's great advances were made in the development of public sector
collective bargaining. Public employees, through a series of illegal,
but effective strikes, began to change the attitude of state and federal
legislators toward public sector collective bargaining. Legislation was
enacted to protect the right to organize and to bargain collectively,
but most of these laws continued to forbid public employee strikes. 15
Interest arbitration developed as a result of the failure of traditional
impasse resolution methods to prevent work stoppages, which
occurred in spite of statutory prohibitions, by public employees. State
and local legislatures recognized the need to design a system which
would protect the public against harmful strikes and at the same time
preserve the collective bargaining rights of public employees.
The task of extending collective bargaining rights to all public
sector employees, comparable to those enjoyed by private sector
workers under the National Labor Relations Act, 16 is far from
complete. While approximately forty states have some form of public
collective bargaining statute, only half of these provide broad
coverage for all public employees. Even fewer state statutes provide
for interest arbitration or the right to strike. 17
Interest Arbitration
A new national labor policy should extend to all federal
employees the right to bargain collectively and the right to use
impasse procedures, including interest arbitration. At the federal
level, only postal workers have comprehensive collective bargaining
14. The central issue in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 1349, (1982) was whether or not the Long Island Railroad, a wholly owned
subsidiary of the New York State Metropolitan Transportaiton Authority, fell under the
jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. IV 1980) or the N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAw § 200 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SErV. Law § 210 (McKinney 1975).
16. National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
17. 51 G.E.R.R. 501 (Apr. 20, 1981). See also Morris, The Role ofInterestArbitrationin
a Collective Bargaining System, 1 INDus. REL. L. J. 427, 457 (1976).
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coverage under the National Labor Relations Act. 18 They have the
right to interest arbitration but they do not have the right to strike. 19
This has been accomplished under a legal mystery which declares that
the Postal Corporation is a private corporation, albeit one entitled to
regular congressional subsidies. Other federal employees are
provided collective bargaining rights, but only within a limited
subject area. They cannot bargain over wages and other economic
benefits and lawfully cannot strike. However, federal employees do
have impasse procedures for new contract terms which, under some
20
conditions, can be final and binding.
The enabling legislation necessary for this new national labor
policy would have to recognize and resolve the question of the
delegation to arbitrators and negotiators of legislative authority over
fiscal matters and other bargaining subjects now governed by statute.
Thus, the major criticism of interest arbitration as it applies to the
public sector employees is its incompatibility with the principles of
representative government; 2 1 i.e., the policymaking responsibilities
of the executive and legislative branches are delegated to an
arbitration body which is not elected and is not responsible to any
one.
This is a simplistic approach to both arbitration and collective
bargaining, however, public sector bargaining is not entirely a
political process: it is moderated by economic forces and the
requirements of public safety. An arbitration board considers these
same factors. This criticism of interest arbitration also fails to
recognize that negotiations which result in an impasse have failed to
find a political solution. The purely political solution of submitting the
issue to the legislature for determination will not be viewed as fair by
public employees. They will perceive such a step as giving the
employer the final word. Negotiators for the employer (the
government) will have little incentive to negotiate fully when they are
aware that persistence will enable them to obtain terms from a body
over which the employer exercises considerable influence. "Thus, a
return to legislative action may itself exert a chilling effect on public
22
employee negotiations.18. 29 U.S.C. § 151. See also Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. § 1209 (1976
and Supp. III 1979).
19. 39 U.S.C. § 1207 (1976).
20. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (Supp. III 1979).
21. See generally, Anderson, Sovern, MacDonald, and O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in
Public Sector Collective Bargaining-An Examination of Compulsory InterestArbitration in
New York, 51 ST. JoHN'sL. Rxv. 453 (1977).
22. Id. at 512-513.
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The New York Experience
One possible and partial solution to the problem of delegation of
legislative authority is to make arbitration awards and collective
bargaining agreements conditioned upon a proviso that an award or
contract, requiring legislation for its implementation, could not be
effective until Congress had enacted such law. The New York City
Collective Bargaining Law (NYCCBL) could be used as a model if
interest arbitration for impasse resolution of federal employee
disputes were substituted for the right to strike.2 3 Such provisions
would be consistent with our democratic institutions and would
recognize, where required, the supremacy of the legislature in the
implementation of bargaining and arbitration awards.
The NYCCBL declares that the policy of the City of New York is
to favor and encourage the right of municipal employees to organize
and bargain collectively, to use impartial and independent tribunals
to assist in resolving impasses in contract negotiations, and to have
24
final and binding arbitration to resolve employees' grievances. The
NYCCBL was amended in 1972 to provide for binding interest
arbitration of contract terms for all employees under the jurisdiction
of the Office of Collective Bargaining. 2 5 New York State's Taylor Law,
which forbids the right to strike for public employees under its
jurisdiction, was amended in 1976 to provide for final2 6and binding
arbitration of contract terms for police and firefighters.
In March of 1982, the New York Legislature passed an
experimental statute providing for the arbitration of any impasse
existing between the Transport Workers Union and the Transit
Authority, who are subject to the Taylor Law, by the Impartial
Members of the Board of Collective Bargaining. 2 7 This legislation,
which covers 40,000 employees, was sought jointly by the
Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Transport Workers Union and
was supported by the Mayor of New York who declared:
The City of New York supports the specific provisions in the hopes
that it will avert an illegal strike by the employees of the Transit
Authority and Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating
23. N.Y. ADmIN. CODE tit. 54, § 1173-7.Oc (1980).
24. Id. at § 1173-2.0 (1975).
25. N.Y.C. LocAL LAv No. 2, 1 (1972); N.Y. LocAL LAws 158-160 [codified at N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 54, § 1173-5.0(a)(8), § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(e) (Supp. 1981), § 1173-7.0(c)(4)
(Supp. 1981), and § 1173-7.0(e), (1980)].
26. 1974 N.Y. Laws 1883 Ch. 724, § 3; 1974 N.Y. Laws 1887 Ch. 725, § 3 [codified at N.Y.
Civ. SEnv. LAW § 209(4)(c)(vi) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).]
27. 1982 N.Y. Laws Ch. 19 (effective Mar. 29, 1982). See, Barbanel, Transit Arbitration
Bill signed by Carey, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1982, at B2, col. 4.
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Authority during the upcoming round of bargaining over the
successor agreements. As is well known, the transit strike, which
occurred in April of 1980, had a crippling effect upon the City, the
citizenry, the business community and people visiting the City.
The City believes that an experiment of binding arbitration for this
round of collective bargaining will be useful in28reaching a peaceful
resolution of the collective bargaining issues.
The arbitration procedures were invoked and, in May 1982, the
panel awarded a three year contract covering more than twenty
issues. 2 9 The award appears to have been satisfactory to both parties.
If the transit arbitration process is regarded as successful, demands
likely will be made on the legislature for the extension of interest
arbitration to other state and local government employees not
presently covered by such provisions, e.g., prison guards and state
police, as well as for the extension of the transit bill, which is due to
expire on December 31, 1982.
Interest Arbitration or the Right to Strike
I should point out that not all public employee unions want to be
covered by interest arbitration law. For example, the leaders of the
Long Island Railroad recently hailed the Supreme Court's decision
retaining their coverage under the Railway Labor Act, 30 which
permits the right to strike. 31 Also, John Sweeney, the President of the
Service Employees International Union, in an address early this year,
asserted that, if his members had to choose either the right to strike
or interest arbitration, his organization would opt for the right to
strike as a necessary ingredient of full-scale bargaining rights.
Sweeney stated that "the right to strike is a moral right which can't be
taken away by law. It is a right which we in the labor movement
cannot, and will not surrender ..

. in the public or the private

sector. "32
As Mr. Sweeney knows, the laws of most states, with a few
significant exceptions, do not recognize that right and in some
28. Mayor of the City of New York, Memorandum in Support of an Act Authorizing the
New York State Public Employment Relations Board to Appoint a Three Member Panel for the
Purpose of Resolving a Labor Dispute. 1982 N.Y. Laws Ch. 19 (Mar. 16, 1982).
29. New York Transit Authority and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Authority, and Transit Workers Union of America, Local 100 and Amalgamated Transit Union,
Locals 726 and 1056 (Arbitrators: Arvid Anderson, Daniel G. Collins, and Milton Friedman,
Apr. 19, 1982).
30. 45 U.S.C. § 151.
31. Greenhouse, High Court Rules L.I.R.R. Employees May Go on Strike, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 25, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
32. 13 LABOR-MANAGE MENT REL. SERv. NEWSLETrER 4 (Apr. 1982) at 2.
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instances provide severe and effective penalties if public workers go
out on strike. In New York, public employees who strike are subject
to the loss of two days' pay for each day they are on strike. The Transit
Workers Union and the Amalgamated Transit Union, which struck for
11 days in 1980, were fined one and a quarter million dollars and the
dues checkoff privileges of both Unions were revoked. 3 3 The
effectiveness of those fines and penalties was one of the reasons the
transit workers joined the Metropolitan Transit Authority this year in
seeking legislation providing for interest arbitration in New York City.
In the correct political environment, the legislative option is likely to
be between a collective bargaining law which forbids strikes and no
collective bargaining law at all.
I recognize that many public employers, if forced to choose
between the right to strike and interest arbitration as a means of
resolving collective bargaining impasses, would also opt for the right
to strike. 3 4 I suggest, however, that these employers' commitment to
effective collective bargaining is questionable, particularly in a
political climate where reality dictates that the strike weapon is most
unlikely to be sanctioned by state legislatures. I acknowledge that
several states, including Pennsylvania, Hawaii, and Minnesota,
permit categories of public employees to strike to resolve impasses, 3 5
but this is usually under conditions where it is clear that the strike will
not be effective.
Either the right to strike or interest arbitration is needed to
stimulate the bargaining process. A national labor policy for public
employees should include the right to bargain collectively with either
the right to strike or the right to use arbitration to resolve contract
disputes.
While interest arbitration cannot provide an absolute guarantee
against strikes in a free society or a panacea for all labor problems, it is
by far the better way to solve public sector disputes. Furthermore, I
do not suggest that arbitrators have all the wisdom to solve disputes.
Yet, they are able to resolve difficult impasses over new contract
terms, particularly when they are allowed to act as mediatorarbitrators in the formation of new contracts.
While I am a firm believer in interest arbitration as an alternative
to the strike to resolve impasses, I am even more strongly committed
33. N.Y. Civ. SERv. § 210(2)(g) (McKinney 1975); N.Y. JUD. LA w § 751(2) (a) (MeKinney
1975); Stetson, '80 Transit Strike Deprives3 Unions of Dues Checkoff, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1981
at B1, col. 1.
34. Remarks of Jeffrey B. Tener at LMRS-AAA Seventh Annual National Conference, 13
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REL. SERV. NEWSLErrER 3 (Mar. 1982) at 6.

35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-1010, (Purdon Supp. 1965-1981); HAwAiI
REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.64 (West Supp. 1982).
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to the collective bargaining process. Interest arbitration should not
take the place of collective bargaining. It should be used as a
supplement. "It involves third party intrusion and thus its use should
36
be the exception-not the rule."
The record of achievement of collective bargaining demonstrates
that it is the best method of matching employer needs and employee
desires. Recent experience in both the private and public sector also
shows that collective bargaining works successfully in adversity as
well as in prosperity. The enactment of more comprehensive
collective bargaining laws will enable the public sector to deal more
effectively with the difficult employment problems of the 1980's,
including the impact of the recession and resulting layoffs and
reduction in force; the continuing problems of accommodating the
affirmative action goals of the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission to traditional concepts of seniority; and the emerging
issues of comparable worth and productivity bargaining. The concept
of gainsharing has resulted in part from collective bargaining in the
New York City Sanitation Department3 7 and further progress still can
be made.
NEW NATIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR LEGISLATION

As part of the new national labor policy, I also advocate a
non-preemptive federal bargaining law for state and local employees
where state laws have not been enacted. As for the non-preemptive
federal law, I would propose the following:
1. Public employees should be granted the right to organize, to
join employee organizations, and to bargain with respect to
the terms and conditions of their employment.
2. Standards should be provided for resolution of representation
disputes, including exclusions for managerial and confidential
employees, unit determinations and elections to determine
bargaining agents.
3. Definitions of unfair labor practices applicable to both
employers and employee organizations should be provided to
enforce and protect the right to organize and bargain
collectively. A neutral and politically independent administra36. Anderson, supra note 21, at 514.
37. City of New York and Uniformed Sanitationmen's Assn., Local 831, Case No.
1-157-80 (Arbitrator Matthew Kelly, Jan. 15, 1981). See, Purnock, 2-Man Garbage Crews
Agreed on for the City, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at Al, col .2. Gainsharing involves the
payment of wage incentives or differentials out of savings realized through improved employee
productivity.
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rive agency should be empowered to implement the foregoing
standards.
4. A framework for the resolution of impasses should be
mandated with wide latitude for experimentation, but
ultimately providing the right to interest arbitration if the
right to strike is forbidden.
I recognize that the present political climate is not receptive to
these proposals. This does not detract from the basic fairness of a
proposal that public employees should receive equal treatment under
a national labor policy which protects the right of private sector
employees to organize and bargain collectively.
Even if the political climate were receptive to these proposals,
the decision in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery3 8 places a limitation
on federal legislative power under the Commerce Clause. In that
decision, the Court held that the extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act 39 (for minimum wage and maximum hour provisions) to
the States' public employees was beyond the scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause. The analysis considered the
increased cost and decreased services that would result from its
implementation. The states' ability to structure such employeremployee relationships in such traditional governmental activities as
fire prevention and police protection would be significantly altered by
the FLSA extension. This would leave little to the states' separate and
independent existence and would impair their ability to function
effectively within a federal system. Therefore, the law, insofar as it
displaced the states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
was beyond the authority
of traditional governmental functions,
40
Clause.
Commerce
granted by the
The seemingly broad holding, that a federal law cannot stand
should it interfere with traditional state governmental ftnctions, has
been questioned and limited in the years since National League of
Cities. Subsequent decisions defining what are and are not traditional
4
governmental functions have dealt with a variety of factual settings. '
38. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
39. Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
40. 426 U.S. at 852.
41. See, e.g., Enrique Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841 (1st
Cir. 1982) (highway authority is an integral governmental function); Amersbach v. City of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (municipal airport is an integral governmental
function); but see Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority, 677 F.2d 308 (3rd Cir. 1982)
(mass transit system not traditional governmental function); Williams v. Eastside Mental Health
Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (11th Cir. 1982) (mental health institution not an integral state
function), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(regulation of mining not strictly a traditional state function).
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These potential contradictions were articulated by Justice
Stevens in a separate dissent:
The Court holds that the Federal Government may not interfere
with a sovereign state's inherent right to pay a substandard wage
to the janitor at the state capitol. The principle on which the
holding rests is difficult to perceive.
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to
act impartially when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold taxes
from his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is
performing his job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal
in the capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an
adjacent waterway, from overloading a state-owned garbage truck
or from driving either the truck or the governor's limousine over
55 miles an hour. Even though these and many other activities of
the capitol janitor are activities of the state qua state, I have no
42
doubt that they are subject to federal regulation.
One recent example of the limitation on the concept of a
traditional governmental function was provided by United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. 43 In that case, the railroad workers
claimed that their collective bargaining rights were guaranteed by the
Railway Labor Act and that the New York State Taylor Law could not
apply because it prohibited their right to strike." The Supreme
Court focused on the definition of a traditional state function. The
discussion showed that the L.I.R.R. and railroads generally have
been subject to federal regulation. When the state took over the
operation of the railroad, it was aware of its regulation as a private
entity. This assumption of control, with the knowledge of this history
of federal regulation, precluded the railroad service from taking on
the character of a 'traditional governmental function.' 4 5 Furthermore,
federal control over state-sponsored activities is not unauthorized
simply because a federal regulation affects state governmental
processes. The interference must be "undue" and that can be
determined only by balancing the intrusion against the federal
46
government's interest in enacting the suspect regulation.
42. 426 U.S. at 880, 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 1349, (1982).
44. Supra at note 14.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 1356; See also, Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Authority, 677 F.2d
308, 310 (3rd. Cir. 1982) where the court reasoned that a federal grant under the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976) precluded the state from claiming "that
mass transit is a service which they [states] traditionally provide."
46. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970); See also Matsumoto, National League of
Cities -From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation,
Amz. ST. L. J. 35, 59 (1977).
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Perhaps the area where the National League of Cities decision
may prove to be most vulnerable is in the concern for the states'
separate and independent existence. Is it possible that a federal
collective bargaining law for public employees would not pose a
threat to the states' separate and independent existence? In L.I.R.R.
a federal collective bargaining law for railroad workers was upheld.
The court found that given the federal government's continuous and
recognized authority to regulate railroads, the states could not say
of a railroad impaired
that RLA's application to the state's operation
47
existence.
its separate and independent
This analysis can extend to federal regulation of public employee
collective bargaining. The ability of Congress to regulate labor in the
private Sector long has been recognized as a legitimate application of
its spending power. 4 8 The federal government's interest in resolving
labor disputes is equally as great as that of the states. For the states to
recognize such a law, when the goal of labor peace is common to both,
would not be a thr~at to their "separate and independent existence."
Either the spendi'ng power or the general welfare clause could be
49
applied to override the intrusion on state sovereignty. While this
rationale could support a federal bargaining law, I hope that the states
will resume the initiative they exercised in the 1960's and 1970's by
extending full-scale collective bargaining rights to all their public
employe s. If they do not, however, this goal can be fostered by the
enactment of a non-preemptive minimum standards federal law as
described above. 50
CONCLUSION

In summary, it is time to turn away from a national policy of
neglect and hostility toward organized labor and to adopt a policy of
implementing the rhetoric of our belief in collective bargaining. It is
time to complete the unfinished agenda of protecting the rights of all
employees to organize and to bargain collectively, to enact laws
calling for collective bargaining at the federal and state and local
levels, laws which provide either for the right to strike or for
arbitration to resolve impasses where the right to strike is forbidden.
Finally, I suggest that it is time for the National Administration
its constant discrediting of the public service by repeated
abandon
to
declarations that "government is the problem," which is gener".AdW
47. 677 F.2d. at 311 (Garth, J., concurring citing U.T.U. v. L.I.R.R. 102 S. Ct. at 1354).
48. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
49. See generally, Shaller, The Constitutionality of a Federal Collective Bargaining
Statutefor State and Local Employees, 29 LAB. L. J. 594 (Sept. 1978).
50. See text p. 80-81.
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taken and, I believe, intended to mean that public employees are the
problem-a convenient scapegoat for our national economic and
political ills. That somehow the people who serve the public, whether
by teaching school, or fighting fires, or providing police protection, or
collecting garbage, or healing the sick or, yes, even collecting taxes,
are somehow less worthy or less efficient than those who work in the
private sector, in offices, factories, businesses and professions, is a
myth which needs to be dispelled.
I was taught, in the classroom and by example, that it was a good
thing to be in the public service. I am not referring to the notion that
government employment is a sinecure, a concept which itself is fast
disappearing. I still think it is a good thing to serve the public. I hope
that our political leaders at all levels of government will recognize the
importance of saying some good things about the value of public
service, rather than contributing to the decline of public employee
morale by demeaning the role of government and trampling on the
dignity of public service. One means of accomplishing that goal is by
the adoption of a national labor policy which encourages the extension
and broadening of existing state and federal laws to provide collective
bargaining for all public employees.
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